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BALANCING, PROPORTIONALITY, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN COMPARATIVE
CONTEXT: LESSONS FOR NIGERIA

By
Basil Ugoclmkwu*
1troduction

QJJlat is the nature of the role that courts perform when they
evaluate human rights complaints? Answering this question
engages two related but contending values in the process of
protecting human rights through judicial means. The first value
is that persons are entitled to certain rights and freedoms that
are either completely outside the controlling power of the
state, organizations and others in the society, or which when
they are infringed could trigger an application for judicial
protection by the victims. The second value is that the state
can impose limitations on certain rights and freedoms but only
if it could justify those lin1itations by showing how they further
overriding public objectives.1 Among those objectives may be
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David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt & Michael Taggart: "The Principle of
Legality
in
Administrative
Law :
Internationalization
as
Constilutionalization" (200 I) 1 OUCLJ 5 at 6 (describing the culture of
justification as one which obliges decision-makers "to justify their decisions
by showing either how the decisions conform to [some values, including
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to protect the rights of others from violation or to preserve
overall public order, health, safety and morality. This article
discusses the evolution of comparative judicial standards for
the balancing of personal rights and freedoms against the
interests of the public at large.
0 ften, a country's constitutional system is central to ho.w
its courts carry out this balancing exercise. While in some
systems, the courts are provided guidelines for carrying .out
this duty, in others they have to develop those standards from
scratch. In this article, I present a historical account of the
.. constitutional and judicial practices of two countries - the
United Kingdom and United States - to illustrate a significant
divergence in methodology and evolution in this regard. After
analyzing the principal pillars of the two systems and their
differences, I will use them as standards to examine the
tradition of Nigerian courts and highlight what similar or
distinct methods, if any, they (Nigerian courts) apply. My goal
is ·therefore not to conduct an inquiry into how Nigeria's
human rights limitation regime compares to other systems with
similar constitutional texts, for which the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights would be an appropriate
comparator. My concern is more with how the constitutional
models and legal systems in the US and the UK developed
standards for substantive human rights review and specifically
the role their courts played in that process.
I have chosen the UK because of its colonial relationship
with Nigeria. British legal traditions continue to significantly
influence the Nigerian legal system. While it will be seen that
British standards for human rights review have evolved .over
time, the Nigerian system which borrows considerable doctrine
from that system has shown little amenability to change. The
those expressive of human rights], or that they are justifiable departures
from those values.").
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British system classically illustrates how judges in a regime
without a written constitution were not only able to formulate
standards of review but kept those standards relevant to
different historical periods. The United States system is
analyzed as well to show how a system with a written
constitution like Nigeria's approached similar concerns, and
again how the role of the courts was central to the
development of that system.
This inquiry is crucial to an understanding of Nigeria's
human rights jurisprudence and any inconsistencies that might
be present in judicial treatment of human rights cases. I
challenge the current methods that Nigerian courts adopt for
reviewing human rights cases. My central argument is that
there appears to be a degree of uncertainty regarding what
standards Nigerian courts apply for adjudicating human rights
complaints. I argue further that this uncertainty could to a
great extent be explained by Nigeria's legal and con~titutional
history and its colonial experience. I therefore conclude that
for Nigerian courts to be effective in adjudicating human rights
cases, they have to create a consistent standard as well as
observe and adapt to comparative experiences in their
methods.
Courts and the Lure of Balancing
To appreciate why balancing is important and to underscore its
role in decision-making, including in adjudication by courts, it
is appropriate to first clarify the doctrine. According to
Aleinikoff, it could apply to all arenas where the resolution of
conflict is the major issue. 2 He argues that in almost all
confliots, especially those that make their way into a legal
2.

T Alexander Alcinikoff: "Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing"
(1987) 96 Yale I.J 943.

4

Tiie Tra11s11atio11al Human Rights Review

system, there is something to be said in favor of two or more
outcomes. Whatever result is chosen, he continues, someone
will be advantaged and someone will be disadvantaged; some
policy will be promoted at the expense of some other. Hence it
is often said that a "balancing operation" must be undertaken,
with the "correct" decision seen as the one that yields the
greatest net benefit. 3
Aleinikoff's reference to "theories of constitutional
interpretation that are based on the identification, valuation,
and comparison of competing interests"4 is especially relevant
in the context of this article., He speaks, for instance, about a
"balancing opinion" by which he means a judicial opinion that
analyzes a constitutional question by identifying interests
engaged by· the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule
of constitutional law by explicitly or inlplicitly assigning values
to the identified interests. 5 For his part, Shriffin sees balancing
as no more than "a metaphor for the accommodation of
values. "6 While all legal disputes warrant some form of
balancing (for example the case of party A being balanced
against that of party B in ordinary criminal or civil litigation)7
to work out their resolution, as a constitutional doctrine,
qalancing has a particular resonance in constitutional theory
and adjudication. It is, however, in the process of analyzing
how the doctrine applies in different constitutional systems,
that divergences become obvious.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

Ibid.
Ibid at 945.
Ibid.
Steven Shriffin: "The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away
from a General Theory of the First Amendment" (1983) 78 Nw UL Rev
1212 at 1249.
Wallace Mendelson: "The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A
Reply to Mr. Frantz" (1963-1964) 17 Vand L Rev 479 ("[m]oreover,
balancing would seem to be implicit in an adversary sys_tem which inevitably
contemplates at least two sides to every case .. ." at 481).
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In human rights cases, I have already identified the
interests that courts seek to balance: individual rights versus
government restrictions on those rights. I have therefore
answered the question, embedded in the doctrine, of "what"
courts are called upon to balance. The next question is "how"
this balancing is actually implemented. Implicit in this question
is an inquiry into the very method that courts adopt in ~arrying
out the balancing act. Different constitutional jurisdictions use
.different balancing methods. In the next section I will analyze
how these methods evolved in the practices of the British and
American systems in -relation to human rights adjudication as
well as how Nigerian courts have struggled with such cases in
the absence of a clear method.

United Kingdom: From Wednesbury "Unreasonableness" to
Proportionality Analysis
The British do not operate a written constitution. Therefore,
rather than constitutional law, they were more inclined· to
speak in terms of administrative law. 8 But in so far as both
branches of public law are concerned with evaluating the

8.

An English writer could therefore talk about the "Europeanization of
English Administrative law" rather than constitutional law. When people
therefore discussed British constitutional law in the past, it passed for no
more than a misplacement of terms. See Chris Hilson: "The Europeanization
of English Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Convergence" (2003) 9
Eur Pub L 125 at 125; see also PP Craig, Administrative Law (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) · ("[f]or some [administrative law] is the law
relating to the control of government power, the main object of wh ich is to
protect individual rights. Others place greater emphasis upon rules which are
designed to ensure that the administration effectively performs the tasks
assigned to it. Yet others see the principal objective of administrative law as
ensuring governmental accountability, and fostering participation by
interested parties in the decision-making process" at 3).
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actions of "public authorities" 9 that do have implications for
human rights, the distinction may be redundant from a strictly
human rights standpoint. The British also did not have, until
the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, 10 any
document containing a list of rights to which their citizens
were entitled. The enactment of the Human Rights Act
domesticated the Convention for the Protection of Human
rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 11
The fact that the British have no written constitution and
no bill of human rights before 1998, ·is not an indication that
indiviqual rights were not legally protected. At common law,
the courts developed adjudicatory standards to test the exercise
of public powers against rights that had been similarly
developed by common law processes. But unlike in those
jurisdictions where constitutionally entrenched rights checked
legislative authority, in Britain parliament is supreme and has
powers by legislative means to interfere with those rights
developed by common law. 12 In reviewing actions deemed to
have violated human rights under British law, the courts
seemed
to
alternate
between
the
principles
of
"unreasonableness" enunciated in the case of Vlednesbury
Corporation case13 and "illegality, irrationality and procedural
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

David Jenkins, "Common Law Declarations of Unconstitutionality" (2009) 7
lnt'l J Const L 183 at 184.
H11111an Rights Act, 1998 (UK), c 42 [H11111a11 Rights Act].
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 at 223, Eur TS 5 [European Convention];
see Jenkins, supra note 9 (arguing that with the enactment of the H11111a11 ·
Rigllts Act " Parliament 'incorporated' rights enshrined in the European
Co11ve111io11 011 Human Rights ... giving .t hem effect in domestic law" at 183).
Jenkins, supra note 9 at 184.
Associated Provincial Picture Houses, limited ·v Wed11esb111y Co1poratio11
(1948) 1 KB 223 [Wednesbury]; see llzhak Zamir, "Unreasonableness,
Balance of Interests and Proportionality" (1992) 11 Tel Aviv U Stud L 131;
J Warren Jones, "The Healthcare Professional and the Bolam Test" (2000)
188 Brit Dental J 237 at 238; Allan C Hutchinson, "The Rise and Ruse of
Administrative Law and Scholarship" (1985) 48 Mod L Rev 293.
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impropriety" as laid down in the Council of Civil Service
Unions case. 14
These principles derived from administrative law but were
used as standards for review of human rights cases as well. In
Wednesbwy, a local authority had power to grant licenses for
cinematograph perfomrnnces under the Cinematograph Act
1909 and could grant a license to do business on Sundays,
subject to such conditions as the authority might think fit to
impose. The authority granted the plaintiffs in this case leave
to perform on Sundays subject to the condition that no children
under fifteen years of age should be admitted to such Sunday
performances with or without an adult. The plaintiffs sued on
the ground that the condition was unreasonable. The court held
that the local authority had not acted unreasonably or ultra
vires in imposing the condition. The court, interpreting what
was meant by unreasonableness in this circumstance, stated
that:
It is true that discretion must be exercised
reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers
familiar with the phraseology commonly used in
relation to exercise of statutory discretions often
use the word "unreasonable" in a rather
comprehensive sense. It has frequently been
used and is frequently used as a general
description of the things that must not be done.
For instance, a person entrusted with a
. discretion must, so to speak, direct himself.
properly in law. He must call his own attention
14. Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for tile Civil Service, [1985] AC
374; see Adam Tomkins: "In Defence of the Political Constitution" (2002)
22 Oxford J Legal Stud 157.
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to the matters which he is bound to consider. He
must exclude from his consideration matters
which are irrelevant to what he has to consider.
If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be
said, and often . is said, to b~ acting
"unreasonably." Similarly, there may be
something so absurd that no sensible person
could ever dream that it lay within the powers of
the authority. 15
This traditional principle of English public law was the
only one that the system used for the purposes of substantive
review but not in the absence of context since the Wednesbury
standard of "[un]reasonableness" meant · different things in
different situations. 16 Therefore in applying the standard,
distinct judicial incarnations of it contested for recognition and
priority. 17
·
In some latter judicial decisions, the Wednesbury principle
was contrasted with newer articulations. While Lord Greene's
formulation considered an unreasonable decision to be
"somethi'ng so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream
it lay within the powers of the authority", or "a conclusion so
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have
come to it" Lord Cooke would later suggest that a decision
would be . unreasonable simply if it were "one which a
reasonable authority could [not] reach. " 18 Observing these
articulations, Elliot stated that although Lord Cooke's
15. Wednesbury, supra note 13 at 229, Lord Greene, MR. ·
16. Mark Elliott: "The HRA 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review"
(2002) 7 Jud Rev 97 at 100.
17.· Ibid; see also Jeffrey Jowell: "In the Shadow of Wednesbury" (1997) 2 Jud
Rev 75.
18. R v. Chief Constable of Sussex exp International Trader's Ferry Ltd, (1999]
2 AC 418 at 452.
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formulation is as reliant as Lord Greene's on the rather vague
criterion of reasonableness, the two tests are very different in
character. 19
Wednesbury was also criticized for other reasons apart
from its apparent vagueness. Not only was it historically
presented as a monolithic standard of review; it was also not as
structured as other comparative standards. At the same time, it
established a ~igh threshold for public interference with human
rights because it accorded more intense deference to .the
judgments of policy makers. 20 These were very significant
cnt1c1sms. Wednesbury's · flexibility would later give
expression to a more structured concept of unreasonableness,
which, according to Elliot, was classically illustrated by
reference to the divergent modes of substantive review
operating in the distinct contexts of human rights and economic
policy cases. 21 Matters of economic policy came to be viewed
as "not justiciable" or "less justiciable", meaning ·that the
courts will intervene with the substance of the decision only in
extraordinary circumstances. 22 In contrast, when decisions
19.
20.
21.
22.

Ibid.
Chris Hilson: supra note 8 at 132.
Elliott: supra note 15 at 101. ·

R v. Secretary of State for the E11viro11111elll exp Hammersmith a11d Fulllam
Lo11do11 Borough Council, [1991) 1 AC 521 (the formulation and
implementation of national economic policy "is not open to challenge on the
grounds of irrationality short of the extremes of bad faith, improper motive
or manifest absurdity. Both the constitutional propriety and the good sense
of this restriction seem to me to be clear enough, The formulation and the
implementation of national economie policy are matters depending
essentially on political judgment. The qecisions which shape them arc for
politicians to take and it is in the political forum of the House of Commons
that they are properly to be det?ated and approved or disapproved on their
merits. If the decisions have been taken in good faith within the four corners
of the Act, the merits of the policy underlying the decisions are not
susceptible to review by the courts and the courts would be exceeding their
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affect human rights, the courts are more willing to review
administrative decisions. 23
While appearing to contain a single foundation fo r
substantive review, Elliot argues that Wednesbury instead
concealed a range of different standards. 24 As noted above, he
substantiates this claim by reference to the scale of divergence
between the kinds of substantive review envisaged between,
for example, economic policy cases and human rights cases.
While economic policy cases involve "an unstructured and
highly deferential form of review," (which could be similar to
the rational b.asis standard in American practice discussed
later) , human rights cases involved the courts in a "more
structured and intensive mode of review" 25 (which could be
strict scrutiny in American practice). Elliot therefore contends,
as does Hilson, that it is inaccurate to suppose that English law
through the Wednesbury test adhered to a single principle of
substantive review. Instead he states that Wednesbury
reasonableness embraced diversity at both the level of structure
and the level of intensity with which different types of
decisions are reviewed. 26
The recognition in certain quarters that Wedn esbury
reasonableness did not properly prescribe satisfactory
standards for the review of administrative powers under British
law became more noticeable after the European Convention
came into effect in the UK. The British are renowned for
practicing the dualist form for the reception of international

proper function if they 'ptestimed to condemn the policy as unreasonable"
Lord ·Bridgc ar597).
: ·i:
23. Ibid.
. ,, .,
I

24. Supra note 15 at 102.
25. Ibid.
26. · Ibid.

•
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law into the domestic legal system. 27 However, in Briruf 8 the
court decided that while unincorporated international treaties
may not fonn part of British law, where either statute or
common law is uncertain or ambiguous, the courts may
legitimately resort to such treaties in order to resolve
uncertainty or ambiguity. 29
This dualist practice played quite a significant role in the
procedure where by European human rights norms and
jurisprudence came to permeate the . British system of human
rights review. The historically dualist orientation of the courts
in the United Kingdom is so well settled that it is not open to
debate. It could tl1erefore be distinguished from any apparent
"back-door incorporation" of the kind that the court rejected in
the case of Chundawadra v. Immigration Appeal Tribunat. 30 In
that case the court foiled an attempt to invoke the
administrative law doctrine of legitimate expectation, and
described it as the "back door" by which tlle claimants sought
to introduce the European Convention into English law. In
particular the tribunal held that while tlle European Convention
could be used in interpreting the law if there was any
ambiguity or doubt. However, where tlle domestic legislation
was ·perfectly clear, it could not provide a proportionality test
as an alternative to Wednesbury unreasonableness. Hunt states
that such statements " inspired little confidence that England's
highest courts were capable of responding with imagination to

-Sec generally Anthony Bradley & Keith Ewing: Co11stitwio11al and·
Administrative Law (Pearson Longman, 2007).
28. R v. Secretmy of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind, [ 1991] 1 AC
27.

696.
Murray Hunt: Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1998) at 127.
30. [1988] lmm AR 161 at 174.

29.
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what [at the time] could scarcely still be called English law's
'new dimension.' "31
Though the above scenario presented only discouraging
possibilities, it was also the case that more than a few experts
in the British system retained the healthy expectation that if
international treaties could be used as aid in statutory
interpretation, their potential use in administrative law was still
enormous. 32 Hunt again asserts that they might offer a
constraint on the exercise of broad statutory discretion, which
was notoriously difficult to challenge by judicial review due to
the inherently deferential Wednesbury standard. 33
The literature irresistibly points to the fact that even prior
to the passage of the Human Rights Act in 1998, and ostensibly
pushed in that direction by jurisprudence from the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the courts in the UK were
already looking beyond Wednesbwy as standard for substantive
review. This happened at a time when the courts had also
developed a new enthusiasm for interpreting domestic law
more generally in the light of the European Convention. 34 As
such, English courts felt obliged, as Hilson expertly articulates
it, to view "an old principle through a new human rights
filter. " 35 It occurred with minimal flourish in ex parte Smith36
when the English Court of Appeal attempted "to adapt the
31. Hunt: supra note 29 at 160.
32. !bid at 134.
33 . !bid.
34. !bid at 139; see also Margit Cohn, "Legal Transplant Chronicles: The
Evolution of Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the
·Administration in the United Kingdom" (2010) 58 Am J Comp L 583 at 607
(since 1948, more than 2500 decisions in the UK have cited Wednesbmy and
used the term "unreasonable," but of these, 2160 - more than 85% - were
delivered after January I, 1990 and 1545, or 61 %, were delivered after
January 1, 2000).
35. Hilson: supra note 8 at 131.
36. R v. Ministry of Defence, exparte Smith, [1996) QB 517.
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traditional Wednesbury basis to provide a standard more in line
with the proportionality test used in the ECHR
jurisprudence. "37 According to Sir Thomas Bingham in that
case:
The court may not interfere with the exercise of an
administrative disrrl"timi rm <;uhc::t::intive grounds save if the
court is satisfied that it is beyond the range of responses open
to a reasonable decision-maker. But in judging whether the
decision-maker has exceeded this margin of appreciation the
human rights context is imponam. I ne more substantial the
interference with human rights, the more the court will require
by way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is
reasonable in the sense outlined above. 38
Although contested among scholars, Smith was positively
reviewed for bringing Wednesbury closer to the ECHR
proportionality standard. Hilson provides two justifications in
support of this viewpoint even though he agrees with Elliot
that Wednesbury is a variable rather than a monolithic standard
of review. First, Hilson states that .the te~t in Smith entails a
more structured exercise than conventional Wednesbury
because it invites the courts to engage in a balancing exercise
between indi~idual rights and competing policy justifications.
Secondly he points to the heightened standard or intensity of
review in human rights cases. 39
Elliot however asserts that, following Smith, the
assumption that proportionality replaced Wednesbury only
supports what he sees as the false premise that prior to Smith
there was indeed a single principle of sµbstantive review. He
argues that structuring the discourse in this manner "fails to
37. Ibid.
38. Supra note 36 at 554.
39. Hilson: supra note 8 at 132.
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acknowledge the established tradition of diversity in this area:
the 'reasonableness or proportionality?' question overlooks the
existing domestic context into which the proportionality test is
being introduced. " 4° Continuing, he submits that once the
diversity in the pre-existing context is appreciated, the focus of
inquiry shifts from the question of whether proportionality may
replace reasonableness, to the relationship between those
concepts and especially the way in which the fom1er
complements the latter by extending the range of options open
to the reviewing courts. 41
One striking feature of the British system is that it adopts a
binary between judicial review of legislation and judicial
review of executive action and administrative decisionmaking. 42 To this point, I have limited my analysis to the first
limb of this binary: the review of executive and administrative
decisions. A different set of principles govern judicial review
of legislation. In theory, under British law the doctrine of
parliamentary supremacy coupled with an unwritten
constitution meant that the judiciary had no role in reviewing
the validity of legislation. 43 This has, however, since the
coming into force in the UK of the Human Rights Act of 1998,
Supra note 16 at 102; see also Mark Elliott, "The Human Rights Act 1998
and the Standard of Substantive Review" (2001) 60 Cambridge Ll 301.
41. Ibid.
42. Jeremy Waldron: "The Core of the Case against Judicial Review" (2006)
115 Yale Li 1346 at 1353. See also Seth Kreimer: "Exploring the Dark
Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s" (1997) 5
Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 427.
43 . Robert B Seidman: "Jurucial Review and Fundamental Freedoms in
Anglophone Independent Africa" (1974) 35 Ohio St Ll 820 at 826; see also
Harry H Wellington: "The Nature of Judicial Review" (1981-1982) 91 Yale
Ll 486 ("(w]e tend to think of courts at common law as acting because the
legislature has not and as making Jaw the legislature can urunake. When
statutes are involved, we see courts either effectuating legislative will or,
through an occasional misreading of legislative intent, as producing an
incorrect decision that can be remedied easily by legislative reform" at 487).
40.
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given way to what some describe as "rights review" which
establishes "a form of judicial scrutiny that can review
democratically derived decision-making by public authorities
for compliance with a set of recognized basic rights. " 44
As important in the British context is the distinction
between strong judicial review and weak judicial review.
According to Waldron, in a system of strong judicial review
courts have the authority to decline to apply a statute in a
particular case (even though the statute on its own terms
plainly applies in that case) or to modify the effect o_f a statute
to make its application conform with individual rights (in ways
that the statute itself does not envisage). Courts here also have
the authority to establish as a matter of law that a given statute
or legislative provision will not be applied, so that as a result
of the doctrines of stare decisis and issue preclusion, a law that
the courts have refused to apply becomes in effect a dead
letter. 45 Waldron cit_es some European courts that possess this
authority and states that, although it appears as though
American courts do not, the real effect of their authority is not
far short of this. 46
In jurisdictions that apply the weak version of judicial
review, Waldron argues, courts may scrutinize legislation for
its conformity to individual rights and may decline to apply it
because rights would otherwise be violated. 47 He cites the UK
as example of the weak version of judicial review since the

44. Colm O'Cinneide: "Democracy, Rights and the Constitution: New
Directions in the Human Rights Era" (2004) 57 Curr Legal Probs 175 at
176.
45. Waldron, supra note 42 at 1354.
46. Ibid at 1355; see also Mauro Cappalletti & John Clarke Adams: "Comment,
Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations"
(1966) 79 Harv L Rev 1207.
47. Ibid.
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enactment of the Human Rights Act. Under the Act's
prov1s1ons, courts may review legislation with a view to
issuing a 'declaration of incompatibility" if the court finds that
the provision under review is incompatible with a right
protected under the European Convention. Under the Human
Rights Act, such a declaration of incompatibility "does not
affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the
provision in respect of which it was given; and . . . is not
binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is
made. " 48 Yet the declaration may· have the effect of causing a
minister .to initiate legislative procedure . to ameliorate the
incompatibility. It is perhaps the influence of the European
Convention that has impelled more intense scrutiny of
executive, administrative and legislative under the rubric of
proportionality.

United States: Balancing, R~tional Basis Review, Strict
Scrutiny .
Unlike the UK, the US operates a written Constitution. At the
time of its promulgation, the US Constitution contained very
minimal reference to human rights guarantees. 49 This led some
writers to argue that this was in conformity with the thinking
of its Framers that the Constitution is essentially designed to
protect individual rights. 50 Ides and May contend that "many
of the Framers believed that the political structure created by
the Constitution was the primary and essential vehicle through

48. Human Rights Act, supra note 10,"s 4(2), (6) .
49. Gerald Gunther: Constitutional Law (New York: The Foundation Press,
Inc., 1985) ("[t] here were relatively few references to individual rights in
the original Constitution: its major concern was with governmental
structure" at 406) .
50. Allan Ides & Christopher May: Examples and Explanations: Constitutional
Law Individual Rights (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2010) at 1.
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which to protect the liberty of the people. " 51 A textual
reference to limitations on the authority of state in the
Constitution is, however, commonly traced to Article IV (the
Privileges and Immunities Clause) as well as Article 1,
paragraph 10 (the Contracts Clause). This is aside from the
prohibition placed on state bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.
But later in its development and having regard to the
particular conditions .o f that period, specific human rights
guarantees were added to the US Constitution by way of
amendments in 1791. However, unlike contemporary
understandings of these rights, which qualify them in light of
overriding public interests, the amendments seemed to have
granted these rights in absolute terms without any limiting
possibilities. For example, the First Amendment, which
established freedom of religion, speech and assembly,
provided that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohib iti~g the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
This provision seemed not to leave any room for the
legislature to control or place limitations on the enjoyment of
the rights guaranteed. "Congress shall make no law ... " could
therefore legitimately be interpreted, given its unambiguous
mandatory appearance, as absolutely prohibitive of any
legislative regulation of the freedoms mentioned. The analysis
I shall make in this section is not however limit.~d to the First
Amendment. It will include subsequent amendments
incorporating what is commonly referred to as the American
Bill of Rights. Black describes the Bill of Rights as "any
51. Ibid.
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document setting forth the liberties of the people" ,52 thereby
referring to all provisions of the original Constitution and
Amendments that protect individual liberty by barring the
government from acting in a particular area or from acting
except under certain prescribed procedures. 53 Among these, he
mentions provisions that safeguard the right of habeas corpus;
those that forbid bills of attainder and ex post facto laws~ those
that guarantee trial by jury, and strictly define treason and
limit the way it can be tried and punished. 54
Does the US Bill of Rights contain absolute or qualified
rights? The answer to this q\lestion is obviously consequential
for how courts approach judicial enforcement. Writing in the
1960s, Black recognized "a sharp difference of views as to
how far its provisions should be held to limit the lawmaking
power of Congress. "55 While one tendency (the " nonabsolutists, " "balancers," or "operationa1ists")56 saw in the
constitutional prohibitions mere admonitions which Congress
need not always observe, the other, of which Black himself
was an in1portant interlocutor, believed that "there are
'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they we~e put there
on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant
52. Hugo L Black: "The Bill of Rights" (1960) 35 NYUL Rev 865.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid at 866.
56. Alexander Meiklejohn: "The First Amendment is an Absolute" (1961) Sup
Ct Rev 245 at 248; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, (1961] 366 US 36
(rejecting the absolutist theory "(a]t the outset we reject the view that
freedom of speech and association .. ., as protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments are 'absolutes,' ·not only in the undoubted sense
that where the constitutional protection exists it m1Jst prevail, but also in the
sen~e that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal
reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its history this Court has
consistently recognized at least two ways ii;i which constitutionally protected
freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk ... " Harlan J
at 49-50).
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their prohibitions to be 'absolutes. "' 57 With such divergent
viewpoints, it will be understandable why still others believed
the First Amendment to be ambiguous. 58
The text of the First Amendment, coupled with its
differing interpretations, made it difficult for the courts to
respond to claims of violations of the amendment principles. If
the absolutist argument prevailed, the legislature would not
have the power to curtail rights thereby enshrined and the
courts would not have a balancing role to perform. If the nonabsolutists had the upper hand, the courts would be called
upon to perform the same duty of balancing rights against
higher societal interests in those situations where the two
interests are in contention. But even if that duty existed, the
Constitution itself, quite significantly, did not provide any
guide or clues to the courts as to how it could be performed.
Fair enough, the American courts did not have much to do
in the early stages of constitutional review because as
important as the absolutist and non-absolutist debate was, a
different controversy raged among the interlocutors on the
spread of the principles enunciated in the amendments within
the US federal structure. The question at issue was Whether the
provisions of the Constitution and the amendments on
individual rights limited the powers of the state governments as
it did those of the federal government. It was widely believed
in the 191h century that the Bill of Rights did not limit the

57. Black, supra note 52 at 867.
.
58. Wallace Mendelson: "On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in
the Balance" (1962) 50 Cal L Rev 821; see also Laurent B Frantz, "Is the
First Amendment Law? - A Reply to Professor Mendelson" (1963) 51 Cal L
Rev 729.
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power of the states. 59 This view was given a judicial stamp of
approval in the case of Barron v Baltimore. 60 However, with
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 there was
an opportunity to extend the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states. Yet this expectation was scarcely met. According
to Epp, "the Fourteenth Amendment remained notoriously
unclear, for the amendment referred only in relatively vague
terms to the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the
United States , life, liberty, or property, due process and equal
protection of laws. 61 An acceptable interpretation of these
broad terms could not be agreed upon by the courts and. wa,s
disputed well into the 201h century .62
In addition to these controversies, neither the Constitution
nor the Bill of Rights contained in the amendments provided
the courts with any procedural resources for scrutinizing the
impact of official actions on human rights with a view to
offering protection to victims. It was therefore left to the
courts to develop standards for substantive analysis.
Historically speaking, though the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was important in articulating the US
rights tradition, it had only a limited impact for a considerable
ti~e after its passage. Pettinga states that in the first eighty
years foqowing its enactment, the US Supreme Court believed
that it protected only racial and ethnic minorities from
discrimination through overt or covert classifications which
disadvantaged them. 63 Continuing, he argues:
59. See Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme
Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1998) at 30.
60. Barron v. Baltimore, [1833) 32 US 243.
61. See Epp, supra note 59 at 30.
62. Ibid.
63. Gayle Lynn Pettinga: "Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by
any other Name" (1986-1987) 62 Ind LJ 779 at 780.
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Because ·the Court believed the scope of protection was so
narrow, it interpreted the equal protection clause as scarcely
limiting state power. State governments were essentially free
to benefit or burden groups within their borders in any way
.they saw fit. At times, the equal protection clause hardly
protected anyone; ethnic and racial minorities could rarely get
relief from discrimination :with an equal protection challenge~
and other groups could never get relief at all. 64
This situation would later give way in the late 1930s and
early 1940s, Pettinga recounts, starting with the famous
Footnote Four of Justice Stone in the Carolene case. 65 In that
case Justice Stone called for more intense judicial inquiry to
protect discrete and insular groups that do not have the
ordinary protection of democracy and therefore are incapable
of any meaningful or effective engagement with that process.
However, in spite of this, the court in the Carolene held that a
piece of economic regulatory legislation was entitled t.o a
presumption of constitutionality.
Stone's court also decided that the legislation in question
should be upheld so long as the government could show a
rational basis for enacting it. The onus was on the party
challenging it to show that there was no r~tiona~ connection
between the government objective that the law purported to
serve· and the restriction itself. Applied in practice, almos.t all
goverm:nent objectives succeeded on the rational basis
justification. There was therefore insufficient protection for
human rights, particularly the rights of minorities under this
64. Ibid at 781. ..
65. United States v. Carolene Products,Co, (1938] 304 US 144. See also Lewis
Powell J1:. : "Carolene Products Revisited" (1982) 82 Colum L Rev 1087
(describing footnote four as . "the most celebrated footnote in constitutional
law" at 1088). See also Bruce Ackerman, "Beyond Carotene Products"
{1985) 98 Harv L Rev 7 13. ·
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standard. This led . to the development of what has been
described as "suspect classification" in American constitutional
practice, following Justice Stone's view in Carotene. By this
classification, "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect [and]
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. "66
Through the doctrine, the courts "concentrate on devising
complex categories and subcategories for identifying the kinds
of rights infringement that merit constitutional review and the
level of scrutiny that should apply to each one. 67 Therefore the
suspect classification doctrine presumed .a law unconstitutional
if it used certain classifying traits. 68 Unlike in rational basis
analysis, in suspect classification cases, in order to survive
such rigid or strict judicial scrutiny, the impugned legislation
or action must be necessary to the accomplishment of a
compelling state interest. 69 Here, unlike with rational basis
doctrine, the onus· was on the government to show that
compelling interest.
Legislation that demanded strict scrutiny, Gunther states,
require a far closer fit between classification and statutory

66. Korematsu v. United Stares, [1944] 323 US 214.
67. Moshe Cohen-Eliya & lddo Porat: "American Balancing and German
Proportionality: The Historical Origins" (2010) 8 Int'l J Const L 263 at 264.
68. Margaret Bichler: "Suspicious Closets: Strengthening the Claim to Suspect
Classification and Same-Sex Marriage Rights" (2008) 28 BC Third World
Ll 167 ("[r]acial classifications have consistently been regarded as suspect
because racial minorities have historically been disenfranchised from the
political process and have a signifying trait (skin color) that is immutable
and readily visible" at 170); see also Joseph Tussman & 'Jacobus ten Broek,
"The Equal Protection of the Laws" (1949) 37 Calif L Rev 341 at 344; R
Richard Banks, "Race-based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse" (2001) 48 UCLA L Rev 1075.
69. Elizabeth S Anderson, "Integratfon, Affirmative Action, and Strict
Scrutiny" (2002) 77 NYU L Rev 1195; John Galotto: "Strict Scrutiny for
Gender, via 'Croson'" (1993) 93 Colum L Rev 508.
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purpose than the rough and . ready flexibility traditionally
tolerated by the old equal protection. 70 In his words:
[M]eans had to be shown "necessary" to achieve
stafutory ends, not merely "reasonably related"
ones. Moreover, equal protection became a
source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the
areas of the new equal protection had to .b e
justified by "compelling" state interests' not
merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state
ends. 71
·
The US Supreme Court with Earl Warren as Chief Justice
would soon kick-start an ambitious policy of identifying new
areas appropriate. for strict scrutiny. The court did so by
searching for two major characteristics: the presence of
suspect classification or the impact of legislation on
fundamental rights and interests. 72 While racial discrimination
maintained its significance as grounds for intervyntion based
on the established suspect classification rule, and fundamental
rights could be identified by recourse to the amendments to the
Consritution, what constituted fundamental interests was far
less clear. While the list of such interests developed by the
Warren court were modest to say the least (including voting,
criminal appeals and the right to interstate travel73),
conunentators searched for justifications for including
analogous situations of which "welfare benefits, exclusionary

70.
71.
72.
73.

Gunther, supra note 49 at 588.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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zoning, municipal services and school financing came to be the
most inviting frontiers. "74
Yet there were those who reasoned that the Supreme
Court's analytical position· in human rights cases defied an
easy categorization into situations requiring rigid scrutiny and
those warranting only deferential rational basis considerations.
Such persons argued that a variety of standards had been
applied to resolve equal protection cases. For example, in San
Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez75 Justice
· Marshall rendered a dissenting opinion where he ·observec;l that
the Supreme Cm,Jrt apparently seeks to establish how equal
protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which
dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or
mere rationality. On the contrary, he stated, the Court's
decisions defy such easy categorization. Justice Marshall held
that a principled reading of what the Supreme Court had done
revealed that it had applied a spectrum . of standards in
reviewing discrimination claims under the Equal Protection
Clause. This spectrum, he continued, clearly comprehended
variations in the degree of care with which the Court would
scrutinize particular classifications, depending on the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected and the invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn. 76
Such thinking later produced a tl1ird standard described as
"intermediate" level scrutiny or "rational basis scrutiny with a

74. Ibid.
75. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, [1973) 411 US 1.
76. Justice White adopted this position in, for example, Vlandis v. Kline, [1973)
412 US 441 (stating that "it is clear that we employ not just one or two, but,
as my Brother Marshall has ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards"' at
458).
.
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bite. " 77 This standard is clearly more intensive than the
deferential or rational basis review yet less demanding than the
rigidity of strict scrutiny. The level of scrutiny protects
persons within a quasi-suspect classification system and is
associated with sex discrimination cases like Craig v Boren18 .
In that case, the court majority held that classifications by
gender must serve impor.tant governmental objectives ·and must
be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
Pettinga identifies three major reasons why the Court
created this third category. First, many scholars criticized the
human rights doctrine. Second, growing public awareness of
discrimination against groups other than racial groups had
increased demands for judicial protection. Finally, the advent
of legal aid for disadvantaged constituencies influenced the
development of creative judicial intervention on behalf of
indigents. 79 Under this intermediate analytical standard, the
court may look more closely at the ends and means of the
challenged statute, instead of merely pronouncing it valid or
invalid under traditional analysis. 80 The Court stated that it
"does not accept every goal proffere4 by the state, and if an
alternative means exists which does not disadvantage the
protected group, the Court can prompt the legislat:Ure to
employ the alternative means by invali~ating the legislation. " 81
A comparison of contemporary British and American
standards of review reveals certain clear points of interest.
77. See Pettinga: supra note 63 at 784. See also Jeremy B Smith: "The Flaws of
Rational· Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court should Acknowledge·its
Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classification based on Sexual
Orientation" (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 2769.
78. Craig v Boren, [1976) 429 US 190.
79. Supra note 63 at 784.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid at 785.
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Perhaps most relevant is that while BritiSh practice is based on
proportionality (though they are loathe to so describe it), in the
US the standard tilts towards balancing. The question then is
whether a real difference exits between "proportionality" and
''balancing.'' To the extent that under both systems serious
efforts are made to actually strike a balance between individual
rights and governmental interests, one might conclude that no
real difference exists between them. Under both approaches,
when governmental action affects the human rights of
individuals, the governmental interest warranting such effect
must be compelling and the means chos~n must be necessary to
achieve that purpose.
But Chaudhry believes there is actually a difference
between American balancing and British proportionality by
reference to what he calls "decisional deference" particularly
in the context of American practice. He notes that in most
jurisdictions (particularly those applying the proportionality
model), rights adjudication consists of a two-stage process that
determines first whether a right is violated and second whether
that violation is justified according to a proportionality
analysis. In these systems, he continues, rights are generally
given a broad interpretation, and countervailing interests are
addressed exclusively under the rubric of proportionality. 82
This contrasts to "definitional balancing" as he calls it in the
context of the American system. This, he says, is a mere onestage approach "which conflates the scope of a right with its
strength. " 83 . What is not contested, however, is that at this
point in both the American and the British systems, once a
governmental action or legislation engages a recognized human
right, a greater burden is placed on the government official or
82. Sujith Choudhry: " After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the
Postconflict State" (2010) 6 Ann Rev Law Soc Sci 301.
83. Ibid at 314.
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institution to justify that action or law. In deciding whether or
not that burden is discharged, the right in questio~ ai:id the
governmental interest justifying its restriction are balanced
through a structured process.
:~~

Nigeria: Struggling. for Justification; Inverting the in

Favorem Libertatas
While in both the UK and US, the cou~ts have applied judicial
tools to demarcate rights and governmental interests, and
weigh them on the balance; Nigeria has adopted a different
approach. Rather than allow the courts to strike the balance
from scratch, the constitution provided a rather rough outline
of how the courts could perform that function. Sectio?- 45 of
the 1999 Constitution provides that:
45(1) ~othing in section& 37 [privacy], 38 [conscience,
thought and religion], 39 [expression], 40 [assembly]
and 41 [movement] shall invalidate any law ·· that is
reasonably· justifiable in a democratic society - (a) in
the interest of defence, public safety, public order,
public morality or public health; or (b) for the purpose
of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons
(2) An Act of the National Assemb_ly shall not be
invalidated by reason only that it provides for the
taking, during periods of emergency, of measures that
derogate from .the provisions of section 33 or 35 of this
Constitution; but no such measures shall be taken in
pursuance of any Act during any period of emergency
save to the extent that those measures are reasonably
justifiable .for the purpose of dealing with the situation
that exists during that period of emergency:

i

. . ·.
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Provided that nothing in this section shall
authorize .any derogation from the provisions of
section 33 of this Constitution, except in respect
of death resulting from acts of war or authorize
any derogation from the provisions of section
36(8) of this Constitution.
This provision sets out the general limitation on the human
rights provisions of the Nigerian Constitution. Noticeably, the
· limitation applies to specific guarantees . This · supports the
proposition that ~t does not apply to ·all of the rights that the
Constitution enshrines. In addition, some of the guarantees
contain independent lin1itation clauses. For example, while
section 33(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to life in
general terms (save in the execution of a death sentence), 84
sub-section (2) thereof qualifies the right by delimiting ·
· situations. where life may be taken. Such situations include
defending another perso.n from unlawful violence, in defense
of property, death arising while someone is ·carrying out a
lawful arrest, to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained, ·Or for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection
or mutiny.
It is equally worth noting that the limitation clause is not
applicable to section 34 of the Constitutfon which places an
absolute prohibition on the use of torture and other inhuman or
degrading treatment. The section also disallows slavery and
servitude absolutely as well as the performance of forced and
compulsory labor barring the exceptions highlighted.
84. Nigeria is among several African countries where the death penalty is still
applied as a criminal sanction. However, some countries on the continent
such as South Africa have abolished the practice. See Dirk van Zyl Smit,
"The Death Penalty in Africa" (2004) 4 Afr Hum Rts Ll 1; Lilian Chenwi,
Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights
Perspective (Cape Town: ABC Press, 2007).
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Furthermore, the right to liberty, guaranteed under section 35,
may be restricted under certain circumstances and in
accordance with certain procedures. Where these are invoked,
the Constitution contains ample provisions for securing
humane treatment, including prompt and expeditious trial, the
right to silence and legal consultation, a right to a written
explanation of the reasons for arrest or detention, and the right
to bail. 85
Finally, the right to fair hearing in section 36 is placed
outside both the reach of the general limitation provisions in
section 45, and any specific limitation for that matter. ·Not
even emergency considerations could place this guarantee at
risk. Rather the proviso to subsection 45(2) captures the wellknown principle of nullum crimen sine Lege - that only
offenses in existence at the time of an accused person's
offending action can be prosecuted (that is, there should be no
retroactive criminalization) and that no heavier punishment
should be imposed than was in force at the time that the
offence was allegedly conunitted.
For· the purposes of analyzing the limitations in the
Nigerian Constitution, one might group the rights into three
distinct categories. The first category consists of those rights
that are exempted from any restrictions in the interest of
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public
health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others
persons . In this category are freedom from torture and other
similar freedoms. The other category consists of those rights
that could be re.s tricted on the basis of these justifications but
only in times of emergency. Captured here are the rights to
life, freedom from forced labor, personal liberty and freedom
from discrimination. Rights in the third and final category are
85.

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 s 34(2)-(7).
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those that could be derogated from at any time on the basis of
public order, morality, health, etc.
As in the two jurisdictions already examined, the role of
Nigerian courts in cases alleging human rights abuses is to
read the guarantees relied upon in those cases and then decide
if the abuses complained of could be justified under any of the
limitations allowed by the Constitution. It is by no means a
light duty. When constitutional terms are as open-textured as
they often are, courts interpreting them must scrutinize
whether they are liberal (in· favor of rights i.e. acting in
. favorem libertatas) or conservative (expanding the limitations
to the detriment of rights). Apart from the words of the
Constitution itself, the Nigerian courts do not have any further
resources that might guide their interpretive orientation. The
task is therefore a complex one, especially since, according to
Okonkwor, the Nigerian Bill of Rights differs from the rest of
the Constitution because it is a statement of principles that
involves the application of non-legal criteria. 86
He argues further that when interpreting these human
rights prov1s1ons,
the courts should consider the
reasonableness and justifiability of legislative and executive
acts. This, he says, compels a subjective, rather than a purely
objective approach that adheres to strict statutory construction.
Therefore, he asserts, the subjective approach involves the
measurement of reasonableness and justifiability in terms of
the historical setting, the local political and social conditions
and local standards of acceptability. 87 Though writing in the
context of the human rights provisions of the Nigerian
Independence Constitution of 1960 and the Republican
Constitution· of 1963, Okonkwor's argument is, however, also
86. R. Chude Okonkwor: "The Legal Basis of Freedom of Expression in
Nigeria" (1978) 8 Cal W Int'I Ll 256 at 265.
87. Ibid.
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appropriate fo r this analysis of the human rights behavior of
the courts under the 1999 Constitution. The human rights and
the limitation provisions in Nigerian constitutions since 1960
have all been quite similar.
Regarding the general limitation clauses, Okonkwor, as
well as Nwabueze, have described them as manifes tly vague
and tlexible. 88 This is ostensibly because it cannot be stated
with any degree of certainty what the Constitution means by
the phrase "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. "
This would seem to be the bane of all. efforts to expand judicial
protection of human rights in Nigeria by judicial means. Yet
this has not elicited as much academic attention as is seriously
needed. In this regard, one might notice how different the
Nigerian limitation regime is from its South African
counterpart, for example. The Nigerian Constitution does not
have an equivalent to section 36(1)89 of the South African
Constitution that points toward the development of standards of
human rights adjudication analogous to proportionality
balancing.
The Nigerian rights limitation regime therefore does not
allow the same structuralism and the development of clear,
standard steps for effective balancing of rights against
88. Ibid; see also B 0 Nwabueze, A Co11stit11tio11al Histo1y of Nigeria (London:
Longman Inc., 1982) at 118.
89. This provision essentially entrenched the proportionality standard of human
rights analysis by providing that: "(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may
be limited only in terms of law of general-application to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, r..king into account all
relevant factors, including (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of
the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d)
the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive
means to achieve the purpose." In the succeeding subsection it is provided
that: "(2) Except as provided in subsection (l) or any other· provision of the
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights."
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governmental interests. A literal reading of the Constitution, a
tradition which Nigerian courts have largely adopted in the
context of its limitation regime, renders the possibility of
effective judicial affirmation of rights illusory. 90 This is not
only true of situations where the courts render positive
judgments in human rights cases, but also in those cases where
the outcomes are negative. Because these decisions are
arbitrary and devoid of clear standards and tests for justifying
governmental intrusions on rights, there is a strong likelihood
for them to be inconsistent and contradictory.
In the circumstanc~s, the distinction that Alexy draws
between the construction of rights as rules and the construction
of rights as principles is especially relevant to the Nigerian
practice. 91 Rather than construct rights as principles, the dearth
of analytical resources equivalent to what is available under the
South African constitution has foisted on Nigerian courts a
situation in which all rights are construed merely as rules. But
not all rights may be interpreted as rules. According to Alexy,
rules are norms that require something definitively. They are
definitive commands (his emphasis) of which their form of
application is subsumption. 92 Alexy argues that "[i]f a rule is
valid and applicable, it is definitively required that exactly
what it demands be done. If this is done, the rule is complied
with; if this is not done, the rule is not complied with. "93
On the contrary, principles, according to Alexy, are norms
requiring that something be realized to the greatest extent
90. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 67 at 266 (suggesting that the balancing
mechanism which in more ways than one resembles proportionality analysis
was devised by the United States Supreme Court to overcome an excessively
literal reading of the constitutional text).
91. Robert Alexy: "The Construction of Constitutional Rights" (2010) 4 Law &
Ethics Hum Rts 20.
92. Ibid at 21.
93. Ibid.
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possible, given the factual and legal possibilities at hand.
These, he argues, are optimization requirements (his
emphasis). He states that "[t]hey are characterized by the fact
that they can be satisfied to varying degrees, and that the
appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on what is
factually possible but also on what is legally possible. "94 Alexy
argues that when human rights are conceived as rules rather
than principles, balancing is eschewed. Of this situation, which
he refers to rather pejoratively as "freedom from balancing"
there is positivist ingredient which makes all questions
connected with the application of constitutional rights'
resolvable only by traditional canons of interpretation. This is
done by appealing to the wording of the constitutional . rights
provisions, to the intentions of those who framed the
Constitution, and to the systematic context of the provision
being interpreted. 95
Applied to the Nigerian context, Alexy's double-headed
theories of "subsumption" and "optimization" have stark
significance. While those provisions in the constitution that
contain non-derogatory rights could be interpreted as rules, the
rights to which the limitation provisions are applicable would
be construed as principles. The first category of rights function
like rules because they express imperatives that are boundless
and limitless. For example the constitutional prohibition of
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment can only be
implemented by an absolute prohibition of those practices. The
prohibition is either honored or it is not. There are no two
ways and no short .cuts. There is therefore no' room for the
application ·of balancing and proportionality, or in Alexy's

94. Ibid.
95. Ibid at 22.
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words, "freedom from balancing" applies. Nothing is available
to balance or to render proportional.
On the other hand, those constitutional rights provisions
that are derogable constitute principles to the extent that they
can be limited: What the constitution mandates regarding this
category of rights is that they be protected or, as Alexy would
argue, optimized to the greatest extent possible. For the simple
reason that in this case there are two competing values - the
rights of individuals and government restrictions on them in
the name of the public good ·- a balancing process is
warranted. What the proportionality doctrine accomplishes in
this regard is to ensure that a fair balance is struck between
these two values and especially that the means used to restrict
the right in question is not more than what is necessary to
accomplish the stated governmental objective.
Since the majority of the rights enshrined in the Nigerian
Constitution fall within the latter category, they should attract
the application of the balancing scheme. But the words
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society," are far too
vague to provide an objective guide for balancing. Nwabueze
also claims that the introductory phrase "Nothing in this
section shall invalidate any law ... " seems to imply a
preswnption in favor of the validity of a law imposing a
restriction. 96 Other commentators share Nwabueze's position. 97
96. Nwabueze, supra note 88 at 118.
97. Okonkwor, supra note 86; see also Kenneth Robert-Wray, "Human Rights
in the Corrunonwealth" (1968) 17 Int'l & Comp LQ 908 (noting that the
Nigerian human rights provisions had been informed largely by the
Europea11 Co11ve11tio11 and stating that "[t]he point has more than once been
made that Articles 8 to 11 of the [European] Convention, which corresponds
to sections 23 to 26 [sections 37 to 40, 1999 Constitution] of Nigeria's
Constitution, permit such qualifications as are 'necessary in a democratic
society'; and that by substituting 'reasonably justifiable' for 'necessary' the
Constitution permits greater latitude. It does. What is 'reasonably justifiable'
may not be 'necessary.' Article 15 (emergencies) is even tighter; the
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The statement "Nothing in this section shall invalidate any
law ... " seems to cast the onus on the person challenging a
human rights abridging law to show that it is not reasonably
justifiable. Nwabueze suggests that the Constitution could have
taken a more favorable approach to the rights in question and
placed a greater burden on govermuental justification if it had
read instead: "any law derogating from a guaranteed right
shall be invalid unless it is reasonably justifiable ... " 98
Nwabueze's suggestion tallies substantially with Taiwo'$ ,
position on the same issue. The latter observes that frame.rs of
successive Nigerian constitutions have always concluded that it
is appropriate to include this clause in the constitutional text.
This, he argues, leads to a conclusion that "such clauses
express attitudes that cut across time periods and individual
preferences among the framers. "99 He therefore asks the
question that the constitutional provision points inexorably to
but only in reverse order: "Do Nigeria 1s constitutional framers
mean to suggest that a democratic ~odety, ·so-called, may
interfere with an individual's right to [for example] respect for
his private and family life, home and correspondence, if such
interference is 'in the interest of defence, public safety , public
order, public morality, public h_ealth or economic well-being of
the community? " 100 Taiwo concludes that if this question yields
a positive answer, then that is a sure sign that the framers of
relevant words being 'strictly required'; and Article 1 (the right to life) goes
even furthe r with 'absolutely necessary,' whereas section 18 of the
Constitution dilutes this to 'reasonably justifiable.' Out in my submission, if
the validity of measures adopted by Parliament or the Government is liable
to be canvassed in a court of law, this change of wording is, to say the least,
most desirable." at 922).
98. Ibid.
99. Olufemi Taiwo: "The Legal Su~jc<.:t in Modern /\fri<.:an.· Law: J\ Nigerian
Report" (2006) 7 Hum Rts R<.:v 17 at 2-1.
100. !hid.
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the constitutions did not take rights seriously, [and] left no
room for doubt that they were aware of the many philosophical
conundrums that their proposal might generate and seemed to
have adopted a crude utilitarian approach in which the rights of
an individual may be sacrificed for the welfare of the many. 101
Among the earliest cases of relevance when analyzing the
attitude of Nigerian courts with regard to what it means for
legislation to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society
is that of Cheranci. 102 It is important to note that this was a
decision of the Northern Region of Nigeria High Court written ·
by a non-Nigerian judge, Justice Bates. In the judgment, Bates
stated that there was a presumption that every law made by
parliament was constitutional and that the courts should
recognize this fact, and therefore apply restraint in deciding
whether a particular law is reasonably justifiable or not. 103 He
101. Ibid.
102. Clteranci v. Cllera11ci, ll960] NRNLR 24.
103. It is unclear how this presumption of constitutionality differs from the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Canada, for example, which also
practiced the British system prior to adopting the Canadian Charter of
Rights a11d Freedoms, 1982 knew better than to continue with the British.
human rights tradition once the Charter was promulgated. See Hon. Justice
JC Macpherson, "The Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms on Executive and Judicial Behaviour" in Gavin W Anderson ed,
Rights & Democracy: Essays in UK-Canadian Constitutionalism (London:
Blackstone Press Limited, 1999) ("[o]ur Co11stifUtio11 Act 1867 states in its
preamble that Canada is to have a Constitution 'similar in principle to that of
the United Kingdom.' Of course, the anchor of the Constitution of the
United Kingdom is the principle of parliamentary supremacy. That principle
was also central to the Canadian Constitution for 115 years. Moreover, the
courts adopted principles of interpretation which tended to respect the role
and laws of government - e. g. the presumption of constitutionality, the
principle of strict construction, the aspect doctrine and functional
concurrency. Those principles are simply irrelevant in Charter litigation.
Government lawyers now must expect to defend their Jaws on the merits. In
so doing, they must be prepared to argue civil liberties doctrine at a
sophisticated level and to articulate candidly and persuasively the policy
factors underlying the challenged law. Moreover, in some aspects of the
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seemed to suggest that judges "should not lightly disregard the
voice of the people expressed through their legislators. " 104
Justice Bates also held that to be reasonably justifiable, a
restriction on a fundamental right must be necessary for the
relevant purposes (set out in the Constitution) and must not be
excessive or out of proportion to the objects it seeks to
achieve. Finally, he held that the presumption places the
burden of showing that the law is not reasonably justifiable on
the complaining party. 105
Perqaps in one view it is not worthwhile to spend a lot of
1
time on the Cherancz judgment because it was delivered by a
regional High Court and is therefore of insignificant
precedential value in Nigeria 's common law setting. Yet it is
an important decision because had Nigerian courts maintained
some parts of the structure it laid out, there could have been
better prospects for a more effective judicial approach to the
enforcement of rights and to the conception of acceptable
limitations on those rights in the country. There are two
observable parts to the court's reasoning in Cheranci. On the
one hand, it presumes the constitutionality of every law passed
by parliament. On the other hand, the judgment set out a
structure, which it would apply to every decision regardless of
whether or not a particular law restricting constitutionally
guaranteed rights is reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society. I will proceed to examine the justification offered in
favbr of the presumption of constitutionality. Next, I will
l

Charter analysis, there is a presumption against the government. For
example, when a law has been found by a court to violate a Charter right,
' the onus shifts to the government to demonstrate that it should be saved as a
'reasonable limit ... "' at 131 -132).
H». Kenneth Roberts-Wray: "Human Rights in the Commonwealth" (1968) 17
Int'l & Comp LQ 908 at 924.

105. Ibid.

38

The Transnational H11111a11 Rights Review

show why the court's approach to reasonable justifiability in
Cheranci offers a yet to be realized opportunity fo r expanding
human rights protection.
The justification offered for the presumption that the
legislature always acts constitutionally is that law-making is a
policy function and that elected representatives arc better
placed to decide matters of policy than an unelected judiciary.
In other words this assertion concerns the supposed countermajoritarian nature of judicial review .106 According to RobertsWray, the primary responsibility for governing the country
rests with th~ legislature and the executive, and it is neither th~
function nor the wish of the judiciary to hinder or interfere
more than necessary. 107 He argues further that if the law
requires the courts to review legislation and discretionary
administrative action, it should not be incumbent on judges to
substitute their own view of how the discretion should be
exercised for the views of those primarily responsible,
provided that what has been done is reasonably justifiable.1°8
As in Cheranci , the court in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Chike Obi 109 came to the conclusion that the
mere fact that a law has been made with the approval of1 the
106. See Mark A Graber: " Foreword : From the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to
Juristocracy and the Political Construction of Judicial Power" (2006) 65 ~d
L Rev l; Barry Friedman, "The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part One : The Road to Judicial Supremacy" (1998) 73 NYU L
Rev 333 at 335; Samuel Issacharoff, "Constitutionalizing Democracy in
Fractured Societies" (2004) 82 Tex L Rev 1861 (equating judicial rcvie:-v
with constitutionalism which "exists in inherent tension with the democratic
commitment to majoritarian rule. At some level, any conception Of
democracy invariably encompasses a commitment to rule by majoritariah
preferences, whether expressed directly or through representative bodies.
the same time, any conception of constitutionalism must accept pre-existing
restraints on the range of choices available to governing majorities").
107. Roberts-Wray, supra note 104 at 922.
108. Ibid.
109. Director of Public Prosecutions v C//ike Obi, [1961] l All NLR (Pt. 2) 186.
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legislature, representing the people, is sufficient to trigger
judicial restraint. To further this restraint, the courts have
adopted a practice that has been variously characterized. Yusuf
and Ogbu-Nwobodo call it a "plain fact" jurisprndential
approach. 110 0 kere refers to it as literal ism or mechanistic
11 1
interpr~tation borne out of political expediency.
Another
conuuontator has described the Nigerian Supreme Court's
approap1 to human rights adjudication as austere and as
discounting the normative force of .the explicil language of the
humatj rights guarantees of the Constitution.112 It is also
sugge~ted that this court minimally considers the general or
specific context or structure of the Bill of Rights. 113
·
This is in part traceable to the history of the Supreme
Cour/ as well as the training and process of recruiting judges.
It is. worth underscoring lhat Nigerian courts have totally
lackdd a reasonable opportunity to develop a human rights
adjudicatory philosophy suitable to Nigeria's specific
coilltitutional history. In this regard, British practice, although
in ip.any respects now divergent from the constitutional course
Nideria chose at independence, continues to lurk in the
(

I l . Hakeem Yusuf: "Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional
Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria" (2008) 30 Law & Pol'y 194
at 212; Samuel Ogbu-Nwobodo, "Pluralism in the Nigerian Constitutional
Framework: A Comparative Study of United States of America and Republic
of India" in Chima Cenlus Nwcze, ed, Co111e111pormy Issues 011 Public

I

l11ternatio11al and Comparative law: Essays in Honor of Professor Christian

I Nwachukwu Okeke (Lake Mary: Vandeplas Publishing, 2009) at 347.
Ill. B Obinna Okere: "Judicial Activism and Passivity in Interpreting

p2.
'

the
Nigerian Constitution" (1987) 36 ICLQ 788 at 803.
Solomon Ukhuegbe: Human Rights Decision-Making in Emergent Cowts:
The Supreme Court of Nigeria, 1961-2000 (PhD Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, 2009) [unpublished].

' I 13. Ibid.
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background like a dead hand from the past. 114 It is significant
that the problematic limitation clause was a British invention.
The constitution the British delivered on the eve of Nigeria's
independence marked the introductiou of this clause into
Nigerian constitutional practice. That clause, and the
interpretation Justice Bates gave it in Cheranci, demonstrates
its bold British footprints.
It suggested that legislative power loomed over the
Constitution's human rights guarantees. Justice Batas called
this the presumption of the ·constitutionality of statutes.\But this
presumption is only of limited significance to the \broader
issue. It exists in one form or another in most constl~tional
systems. However, it is not cast in concrete, rathe~, it is
rebuttable. The bigger obstacle then is to adopt an
interpretation of this presumption in line with that of Justice
Bates in Cheranci. Not only did he view this presumption as a
form of restraint on judicial activity, he further interpr~ted it
as placing the onus of proving that a law is not " reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society" on the party alleging that
such a law ~u~tails constitution~lly ent~enched ~ights. \~his
looks very sumlar to the American rat10nal basis doc(\"me,
which was found to insufficiently protect human rights. Bht in
the British practice prevailing in that Nigerian con ext,
parliamentary supremacy was dominant and actually qualified
114. Sandra Pullerton Joireman: " Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rulr of
Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy" (2001) 39 J Modern Afr Stud F 1
("[i]ndeed, in Nigeria and Kenya at independence, the courts and legal
systems became closer to English common law than they had been un~er
British colonial rule" at 577); see also Robert Seidman, "The ·Reception'1 of
English Law in Colonial Africa" in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckam & Franhs
Snyder, eds, The Political Economy of Law: A 171ird World Reader (NJw
York: Oxford University Press, 1989) ("all the judges in Colonial Afri~a
were non-African until the tag end of the imperial era, when a few We;t
African judges were appointed, all of whom, however, were trained an':i
qualified in England. This was hardly accidental..." at 111).
l

l
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the rights recognized at common law. Legal education and
judicial experience revolved around this tradition.
In Nigeria, the limitation clause from which this tradition
was deriv.cd was repeated in the 1979 Constitution and again in
Nv,1abuczc observes that Nigerian
the 1999 Constitution.
judges arc handicapped by their English education and judicial
techniques that insulate them from the values and needs of the
Nigerian people. 115 He asserts that:
Their [Judges'] minds have become imbued with
ideas
about
the
unquestionability
of
parliamentary legislation under English law and
about the perfection and synunetry of the
common law as to render them almost incapable
of performing effectively the more creative role
demanded of them by constitutional adjudication
under a written constitution. They are unfamiliar
with the constitutional decisions of courts in the
U.S. and with the vast literature of American
constitutional law, which have greater relevance
to the problems that are presented to them than
the English decisions which are their stock-intrade. 116
I now turn my attention to those portions of the decision in
Cheranci that could have made judicial protection of human
rights in Nigeria more robust and effective, had the courts
followed and developed them. I take this approach, not only
because Cheranci remains the only Nigerian court decision that
115. Ben 0 Nwabueze: Judicialism in Commonwealtll Africa: The Role of Courts
in Government (London: C Hurst, 1977).
116. Ibid at 311.
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offers an expanded definition and explanation of "reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society'', but also because it clearly
introduced the element of balancing and proportionality that is
now the hallmark of acceptable reviews of laws and actions
that restrict human rights. As surprising as it may be, Justice
Bates, the author of the judgmenl, was in fact an English
judge. Iu Cheranci, Justice Bates decided that a reasonably
justifiable restriction on human rights "must not be excessive
or out of proportion to the objects which it is sought to
achieve.'·' He introduced the element of "proportion", which if
maintained at that time would have established a departure
from Nigeria's dependency on unhelpful English case-law and
practice and the development of jurisprudential principles
flowing directly from the very text of the Constitution.
There is therefore a relationship between the failure to
consolidate on the proportionality part of the Cheranci decision
and the persistence of what I identified earlier as "adhocism",
"plain factism" and "literalism." If Nigerian courts had
followed the proportionality reasoning behind the Cheranci
decision, it would have been wrong to argue that the
Constitution's limitation provision placed· the burden on the
individual challenging a law or executive action to prove that
such law or action is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society .117 Proportionality analysis and the balancing of rights
and interests usually proceeds in stages with specific questions
asked at each stage.
One major question that usually arises within the
what
legitimate
proportionality/balancing
matrix
is:
governmental objective is a particular restriction on a
117. Okonkwor, supra note 86 (arguing that "the words 'nothing in this section
shall invalidate any law .... ' ... seem to be tilted in favor of the derogatory
law, which thereby shifts the onus to the challenging person to prove that the
law is not reasonably justifiable" at 263).
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constitutionally guaranteed right serving? It would appear
improper to place the burden of identifying and justifying the
objective on the party challenging the restriction. The rationale
for this position is simple: who better than the govenunent to
convince the· court of lhe legitimale goal of a challenged law or
other governmental aclion and, in the Nigerian context, how
such a law or aclion could be reasonably justified in a
democratic society. In fact, it is a contradiction to require that
the restriction on a right be proportionate while at the same
time placing ~e burden of proving proportionality on the
person challenging the restriction.
The failure to stand by the Cheranci proportionality
formula has only led to a hazy and fragmented judicial
landscape in which courts reach decisions without offering any
coherent explanation for doing so. As a result, the legal
problems are dealt with on a case-by-case basis often with the
instant case benefitting little or not at all from previous cases
by way of a structured process. In historical terms, two cases
illustrate this situation. In Williams v. Majekodunmi (No. 3), 118
the plaintiff who happened to be a prominent lawyer
challenged a restriction order placed on him by the
government. While he argued that the order was not
reasonably justifiable, the government argued otherwise. In its
judgment, the Supreme Court held that the restriction order
was not reasonably justifiable. When interpreting the words
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society," the court
stated:
Those words ... must be read in the context of the
Constitution, and more particularly in the
context of Chapter III in which they occur. The
118. Williams v. Majekodu11mi, (No. 3), [1962) l ALL NLR 413.
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Chapter confers certain fundamental rights
which are regarded as essential and which are to
be maintained and preserved; and they are to
serve as a norm of legislation under majority
rule, which is tbe form or rule pervading the
constitutions. If they are to be invaded at all, it
must be only to the extent that is essential for the
sake of some recognized public interest, and
may not be farther. 119
Quite surprisingly, in Adegbenro v. Attorney Ge.neral of
the Federation, 120 which arose from similar facts as the
Williams' case, the Supreme Court held that the restriction
order placed on the plaintiff was reasonably justifiable. The
court in this case reasoned that:
[T]here has in this case before us been shown to
be ample grounds for the restriction placed on
the movements of the plaintiff in the interest of
peace and avoidance of bloodshed as deposed to
by the defendant's witness. We have it before us
that before the purported appointment of the
Plaintiff there was a Premier of the Western
Region who is alleged to have been removed
from office; that as a result there were two
factions in the party in power in that Region;
that the plaintiffs attempt to hold a meeting of
the House of Assembly ... sparked off the
disturbance which has led to the restriction order
served on the Plaintiff; and finally, that the
plaintiff desires to return to the duties of Premier
119. Ibid al 426.
120. Adegbenro v. Attorney General of the Federation [1962) 1 ALL NLR 431.
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of that Regiou.. In my judgment the steps which
have been t~ken are reasonably j ustifiable as a
preventive measure to attain peace and order. 121
Invoking only_ a-: _couple of British authorities by way of
rationale, one author has argued that the court was right to
reach two contradictory judgmcnts in these cases with similar
facts. 122 I am reluctant to agree with his conclusion. While the
two cases did have some distinct facts, which may have played
a role in the position adopted by the court, the judgments,
especially in the ~atter case, could be rightly questioned . In
both cases the court appeared more desperate to justify the
restriction than to strike a balance between the restriction and
the rights of the individuals concerned. Even while ruling in
favor of the challenger in the earlier case, the court did not
develop any helpful standards that could have benefitted
subsequent litigation. For all intents and purpose.s, the court
simply said that the restriction was not reasonably justifiable.
A critic of the court's position could reach the exact
opposite conclusion much in the same manner as the court
itself. That is why justification is crucial. And it does not seem
likely that any such justification could be advanced without at
121. Ibid at 439; see Ch11lcwu111a & Others v. Commissioner of Polin·. 12005) 8
NWLR (Pt 927) 278 [C/wkw11111a]; and see !11spector General 1>/ ·l'olice v All
Nigeria Peoples Party & Otlters, (2007] 18 NWLR (Pt l066) 457 lANPP]
(for more recent examples of this degree of inconsistency in decisionmaking. Both cases were delivered by the Nigerian Court of Appeal. They
had similar facts and concerned the same provision of· the Nigerian
Constitution. Yet in the latter decision, the court did not even as much as
acknowledge that a similar decision had been rendered in the past on same
legal provision and similar facts).
122. Kaniye S. A. Ebek:u: "Constitutional Guarantee of Personal Liberty and
Preventive Detention in Nigerian Law" (1995) 7 Afr J Int'I & Comp L 620
at 637.
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least attempting some balancing activity. It is a balancing
process such as this that leads to the development of a
structure and therefore a standard. Thus, absent any clear
structure from which justification could be deduced in a logical
fashion, it was not that surprising that the court in each case
reached opposite conclusions.
More recent court decisions, especially since the 1999
restoration of civil rule in Nigeria, suggest that the culture of
lack of balancing in human rights analysis is now firmly rooted
in its judicial practices. In this regard, the cases of Chukwuma
and Others v. Commissioner of Police 123 and Inspector General
of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party and Others 124 decided
between 2005 and 2007 by the Nigerian Court of Appeal, are
relevant to this analysis. In both cases, the question was
whether it is constitutional, given the right to association and
assembly in the 1999 Constitution, for the Public Order Act
1990 to require a police pem1it to properly and peacefully
conquct public assemblies, meetings and processions. Both
were decided by the Court of Appeal though at two different
divisions.
The police in the Chukwuma, the first case, had invaded a
private hotel where some Nigerian citizens belonging to a
socio-cultural organization were gathered for a meeting. They
broke. up the gathering and sealed off the venue on the pretext
that no police permit had been obtained for the meeting. The
Court of Appeal held that the police were right to disband the
meeting because the organizers did not obtain the required
permit. In the Chukwuma judgment, the court did not even as
much as recogniz·e the constitutional right of assembly and its
relationship to the Public Order Act, particularly with regard

123. Chukwuma , supra note 121.
124. ANPP, ibid.
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to balancing the right against the social good of maintaining
public peace.
In ANPP, the second case, twelve registered Nigerian
political parties conunenccd the legal action requesting the
Court of Appeal to determine whether a police permit or any
other similar written offi~ial authority is required to hold a
rally or procession in any part of Nigeria. They also sought to
know whether the provisions of the Public Order Act which
prohibit rallies or processions without a police pennit are
illegal and unconstitutionaJ in light of the guarantee of the right
of assembly under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution.
In my opinion the Court of Appeal in ANPP correctly
identified the main question for consideration which was
whether the provisions of the Public Order Act, particularly
those which required conveners of meetings or political rallies
to obtain police permits in the exercise of their constitutional
rights to freedom of assembly and expression, is reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society. 125 It came to the conclusion
that the police permit requirement cannot be used as a
camouflage to stifle the fundamental rights of citizens. On this
basis it deemed several sections of the Public Order Act to be
inconsistent with the Constitution and declared them null and
void.
Why would the court reach contradictory decisions in two
cases with clearly similar facts? In ANPP, the latter case, the
court referred to Chukwuma but was ambiguous about whether
or not it was overruling this older judgment. Though the court
attempted to distinguish the ~wo cases, it did so in a manner
that is, in my view, harmful of the right rather than protective
of it. I say "harmful" because the court in ANPP, after

125. ANPP, supra note 121.
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recalling that Chukwuma had preserved the Public Order Act,
stated:
[T]he court never decided that the Inspector
General of Police [IGP] was empowered to issue
police permit or disrupt any public gathering for
which no license has been issued by the
Governor of a state or his authorized agent.
Superior police officers referred to under section
4 of the Police Order Act · means the
Corn.missioner of Police or any of the senior
police officers under the state police command.
The [IGP] has no s~tutory backing to usurp the
powers of the governor to issue license for
public meetings or delegate such powers to the
Commissioner of Police. The appellant has
failed to appreciate the trend in all democratic
countries whereby the right to hold.meetings and
assemblies is no longer subject to the whims and
caprices of the government or secu.rity agents. 126
This reasoning shows considerable hesitancy at both ends
of the justification spectrum. It did not ·.clVerrule the earlier
decision. Yet it did not preserve it in the manner it was
initially ~endered. The court's difficulty in ANPP appears to be
a reluctance to act decisively by overruling the earlier
decision. By trying to distinguish between the IGP and the
State Commissioner of Police in terms of who has overall
competence over. the issuance of licenses for meetings and
assemblies, it avoided the larger question of whether the Public
Order Act can possibly co-exist with the rights enshrined under
the Constitution. ·Although the court in the ANPP reached the
126. Ibid, at 490.
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correct verdict overall, its failure to reject and nullify the
Chukwwna verdict leaves far too much uncertainty in the
jurisprudence.
But beyond the contradiction in the overall outcome of
both cases, !here is the larger issue of the absence of any
strnctured justification in either of the decisions. This further
stTengthens my contention that Nigerian case law lacks clear
judicial standards for justifying intrusions on constitutionally
protected rights. Evidence discussed above of how such
questions are dealt with in other jurisdictions shows that it is
insufficient to skirt around the issues and draw· a conclusion
without laying out the standard by which that conclusion was
reached. There is therefore an element of reflexivity and
arbitrariness in the approach of the highest courts which
inevitably sips down the lower judicial cadres. By this, I mean
the tendency among Nigerian judges to rely on open-ended
rationalizations in their judgments that make it ha.rd .to pin
them down to any discernible analytical pattern. Could this be
a deliberate ploy by judges to create an environment that
justifies their decisions without regard to consistency or
integrity? If this is the case, what reasons could be adduced for
it?
I
Karibi-Whyte, a l~e'tited Judge of the Nigerian Supreme
Court offers what wouid. : s~em to be an insider's explanation
for the ambivalent posture of tlle court. He states that ·in
coming to these decisions the court applied ordinary rules of
construction of statutes. The constitutional provisions were
const~ed, he continued, as though they were ordinary s~tutes
of the imperial Parliament or the local legislature as the case
may be. No special emphasis, he said, was laid on the fact that
the liberty of the citizen was involved and that in such cases
the benefit of doubt in a decision between the executive and
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the citizen should be given to the citizen. In conclusion, he
advised that, in construing the provisions of statutes which
infringe upon human rights guarantees, the court should in all
cases lean towards the liberty of the subject but should be
careful by not to go beyond the natural construction of the
statute. 127
This is a clear indication of the court's failure to carry out
any balancing scheme, which significantly differentiates the
Nigerian courts' approach to human rights from the practices
of the other jurisdictions analyzed in this paper. I had shown
how American balancing is generally similar to the
proportionality analysis that is a feature of both British and
South· African contemporary constitutional cultures. In these
jurisdictions, the courts have developed standards of analysis
that guide any court faced with a human rights case, regardless
of the nature of the right involved. In all three jurisdictions,
the questions asked at each stage of the analysis are similar. It
is, however, difficult to point to comparable standards in the
practices of Nigerian courts. This has telling consequences for
uniformity in court practices as well as for the objectivity of
decisions rendered. It must be clear that the approach of the
courts is consistent, otherwise precedent is of minimal benefit
and there is an increased chance that courts faced with similar
facts will reach contradictory decisions, as is currently the
case.

Why Nigeria Needs a Proportionality Template
Given the points I have made in the above sections, it seems
the Nigerian judiciary can no longer avoid a proportionalitybased system of constitutional rights review. This is
127. Adolphus G. Karibi-Whyte: The Relevance of the Judiciary in the Polity - in
Historical Perspective (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies,
1987) at 58-59.
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imperative, not only because the constitutional provision that
governs the limitation of human rights in Nigeria warrants
doing so, but also because the proportionality-based system has
many inl1erent advantages, which explain why it is widely
adopted by constitutional regin1es around the world in
contemporary times. 128 Among other jurisdictions, it is used by
the European Court of Human Rights, 129 the United
Kingdom, 130 South Afr ica, 131 India, 132 South Korea, 133
Germany, 134 Canada, 135 New Zealand, 136 and Brazil. 137. The
128. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews: "Proportionality Balancing and
Global Constitutionalism" (2008) 47 Colum J. Transnat'l L 72; David M
Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004) at 159; Stephen Gardbaum: "Limiting Constitutional Rights" (2007)
54 UCLA L Rev 789; David S Law, "Generic Constitutional Law" (2005)
89 Minn L Rev 652; Francis G Jacobs, "Recent Developments in the
Principle of Proportionality in European Conununity Law" in The Principle
of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe, Evelyn Ellis, ed, (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1999) at 1.
129. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 67.
130. Julian Rivers: "Proportionality. and Variable Intensity of Review" (2006) 65
Cambridge Li 174; Margit Cohn, "Legal Transplant Chronicles: The
Evolution of Substantive Review of the Administration in the United
Kingdom" (2010) 58 Am J Comp L 583.
131. S. v. Zuma & Others, [1995] (2) SA 642; Richard Goldstone, "The South
African Bill of Rights" (1997) 32 Tex lnt'l Li 451.
132. SR Bommai v. Union of India, [1994] 2 SCR 644; Gary Jeffrey Jacobson,
"Bommai and the Judicial Power: A View from the United States" (2008)
Indian J Const L 38.
133. Kyung S. Park: "Korean Principle of Proportionality, American Multileveled Scrutiny, and Empiricist Elements in U.S. - Korean Constitutional
Jurisprudence" (2001) 1 J Korean L 105.
134. Susanne Baer: "Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional
Court" (1998) 5 Colum J Eur L 249; T Jeremy Gunn, "Deconstructing
Proportionality in Limitations Analysis" (2005) 19 Emory lnt'l L Rev 465.
135. R. v. Oakes, [1986) I SCR 103; see also Dieter Grimm, "Proportionality in
Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence" (2007) 57 UTLJ 383;
Sujit Choudhry, "So what is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades. of
Proportionality Analysis under the Canadian Charter's Section l" (2006) 34
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proportionality principle does not appear to discrim inate in
terms of the legal systems to which it might apply. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the above-mentioned
countries comprise common law as well as civil law
jurisdictions. Moreover, not only in multiple domestic legal
arena, but also transnational courts and instirutious, have
adopted the proportionality principle. 138
Furthermore, it is as equally present among countries
whose constitutional traditions allow the courts to discover the
limitations of rights through practice and experience, such as
for example the United States 139 and United Kingdom, as it is
Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 501; Lorraine Weinrib: "Canada's Charter of Rights:
Paradigm Lost?" (2002) 6 Rev Const Stud 119.
136. Minislly of Transport v. Noon: [1992] 3 NZLR 260; Jan Stemplewitz,
"Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Case for Parliamentary
Responsibility for Human Rights Protection" (2002) VUWL Rev 14.
137. Alonso Reis Freire: "Evolution of Constitutional Interpretation in Brazil and
the Employment of Balancing 'Method' by Brazilian Supreme Court in
Judicial Review" online:

< hup:l/www.e11elsy11.gr/papers/w151Paper%20by %20Prof%20Alo11so %20
Reis%20Freire.pdf>; Viad Perju: "Proportionality and Freedom: An Essay
on Method in Constitutional Law" Boston College Law School Paper Series,
7-1-201 l.
online:
<//up ://lawdigi1aleo111111011s. be. edu/cgi/vieweontent. egi ?article= J363&eom

ext= lsfp&seiredi r= 1&referer=hlfp %3A %2F%2Fsellolar.google.ea %2Fsellolar%3Fstarr
%3D20%26q %3Dproportio11ality %2Banalysis %2Bin %2Bbrazil %2Beo11stit111
ional%2B/aw%26'11%3Den %26as_sdt %3D0%2C5Hseareh = %22proponion
ality %20a11alysis%20brazil%20eo11sti1111io11al%20law%22 >.
138. Axel Desmedt: "Proportionality in WTO Law" (2001) 4 J Int'l Econ L 441;
Carol Harlow: "Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and
Values" (2006) 17 Eur J Int'I L 187; Benedict Kingsbury, "The
Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance" (2005) 99 Am Soc'y
Int'I L Proc 143.
139. Although balancing and proportionality are sometimes viewed as distinct
standards, some scholars see the difference between them as being that
between six and half a dozen. See Gregoire CN Webber: "Proportionality,
Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship" (2010) 23 Can
JL & Jur 179 (" [t]o claim that constitutional law has entered the age of
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in other jurisdictions like South Africa and India whose
constitutions prescribe a range of permissible limitations to
constitutionally enshrined human rights. Therefore, Nigeria
might adopt the proportionality standard for the simple reason
that it offers a more consistent mechanism for justifying
governmental abridgment of human rights and also because a
large number of states have already embraced it. As such,
Nigeria would not be doing anything extraordinary in looking
that direction as well.
The adoption of a proportionality mechanism by Nigerian
courts would also free the courts from the rules versus
principles difficulty that Alexy identified. With a balancing
regime in place , the Nigerian courts will rely less on
traditional constitutional canons of interpretation that they have
hitherto used but w~ich have in no way deepened the
understanding and enforcement of rights in the county.
M oreover, balancing ensures that the burden of proof is
properly fixed. It places the onus on the government to justify
a restriction on the basis of compelling objectives for which
there are no alternative options. A proportionality mechanism
would also have significance for uniformity in the judicial
construction of rights and for certainty in legal outcomes.
Moreover, a proportionality-based system of rights review

balancing - that it embraces discourse and practice of balancing - is no
exaggeration). Indeed, constitutional law is now firmly settled in this age:
for example the Canadian scholar David Beatty maintains that
proportionality is an 'essential, unavoidable part of every constitutional text'
and 'a universal criterion of constitutionality'; German scholar Robert
Alexy, for his part, maintains that balancing 'is ubiquitous in law' and that,
in the case of constitutional rights, balancing is unavoidable because 'there is
no other rational way in which the reason for the limitation can be put in
relation to the constitutional right'" at 179).
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seems more impartial and neutral 140 than the current standardfree mechanism that Nigerian courts operate. It offers a more
coherent justification of court judgments because there is an
opportunity in the balancing process to weigh all of the values
implicated, rather than simply reaching a decision in a
capricious fashion.
Deeiding human rights cases arbitrarily has consequences
for the courts and the judge as Wechsler expertly articulated
several decades ago. 141 He was of the view that both the judges
who decide human rights cases and non-judges who criticize
those judgments are under an obligation to indicate the
standards by which they arrive at their choices and positions.
Wechsler's position bears being reproduced extensively:
If courts cannot escape the duty of deciding
whether actions of the other b~anches of the
government are consistent with the Constitution,
when a case is properly before them in the sense
I have attempted to describe, you will not doubt
the relevancy and importance of demanding
what, if any, are the standards to be followed in
interpretation. Are there, indeed, any criteria
140. See Webber, ibid (underscoring one of the major contentions of
proportionality proponents, that the system "attempts to depoliticize rights
by purporting to turn the moral and political evaluations involved in
delimiting a right into technical questions of weight and balance" though he
questions this same contention when arguing that "the attempt to evade the
political and moral questions inherent in the process of rights reasoning is
futile (because] identifying the interests that are to count and determining
their weight cannot proceed apolitically and amorally" ar 188); see also
Stavros Tsakyrakis: "Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?" (2009)
7 Int'l J Const L 468 (stated that "balancing, in the form of proportionality,
is nothing but a manifestation of the perennial quest to invest adjudication
with precision and objectivity" at 469).
141. Herbert Wechsler: "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law"
(1959) 73 Harv L Rev 1.
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that both the Supreme Court and those who
undertake to praise or to condemn its judgmen~s
are morally and intellectually obligated to
support? Whatever you may lhink to be the
answer, surely you agree with me that I am right
to state the question as the same one for the
Court as for its critics. An attack upon a
judgment involves an assertion that a court
should .have decided otherwise than as it did. Is
it not clear that the validity of an assertion of
this kind depends upon assigning reasons that
should have prevailed with the tribunal; and that
any other reasons are irrelevant? That is, of
course, not only true of a critique of a decision
of the courts; it applies whenever a
determination is in question, a determination that
it is essential to make either way. 142
Wechsler added that a judge's decision should not "turn on
the immediate result" 143 because that would then imply that
"the courts are free to function as a naked power organ, that it
is an empty affirmation to regard them ... as courts of law. " 144
Otherwise courts would only be doing "ad hoe evaluation" (of
the kind that I think Nigerian courts are guilty) which
Wechsler believes poses the deepest problem for American
constitutionalism "not only with respect to judgments of the
courts but also in the wider realm in which conflicting
constitutional positions have played a pa.rt in our politics. " 145

142.
143.
144.
145.

Ibid at 10-11.
Ibid at 12.
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In spite of its global appeal, proportionality analysis is also
often criticized. Among these criticisms is the lack of clarity as
to " what is weighed (interests, principles, rights,
considerations); how it is weighted (with what metric); and
who is doing - or should do - the balancing (judges or
legislators"). 146 Arguably, the goal of human rights is not only
to protect certain individual fundamental interests from
arbitrary state power but also from collective interests. 147 It
follows therefore that any document for the protection of
human rights already gives priority to rights. This, it ·is further
argued, already reflects a balance, the outcome of which must
be that human rights are to be protected before other interests
are even taken into consideration. 148 As such, Tsakyrakis asks
the question, "[i] f that is so, what does it mean to say that the
issue is to strike a further balance between the general interest
of the community and individual rights?" 149
. As significant as this question is, it ignores an important
fact that comparative constitutional rights enforcement must
grapple with. The understanding of the value of rights in a
constitutional system is not uniform across all jurisdictions.
While in some jurisdictions it is taken for granted that rights
will always prevail over governmental and collective interests;
and that the individual deserves protection from the invasive
activities of these social actors, in other jurisdictions, like
Nigeria, the reverse appears to be the case. Not only are
individual rights subordinated to governmental and collective
interests~ in fact some in Nigerian society believe that it is the
government that should be protected from the individual in
spite of its awesome powe:rs. Societies like Nigeria cannot
146.
147.
148.
149.

Tsakyrakis, supra note 140 at 470.
Ibid at 475.
Ibid at 476.
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ignore the imperative of balancing and proportionality because
the level of tension between the interests involved suggests no
better or more appropriate means of resolving of them.
Conclusion
I end this article where it started: serious interests arc in
contention in every effort to protect human rights by judicial
means. Most legal systems recognize this fact. They therefore
have devised mechanisms and methods that .enable the courts
to carefully balance those interests in order to reach the most
appropriate and objective decisions. Because a variety of rights
are often at risk of infringement and litigation to remedy this
can come in large numbers, there is a need for . a balancing
mechanism which ensures that regardless of the nature of the
right involved, the quest~ons surrounding it .are answered in
such a manner that the decision in any given case lays a
foundation upon which similar cases could be approached in
fu~re. This ensures that decisions are not reached arbitrarily.
It also ensures that subjectivity does not trump objectivity
given that when there are clear standards for balancing the
interests in contention in human rights cases, it does not matter
much who the judge is. The same standard governs all similar
cases. The law is more certain and precedent is more
meaningful.
From every indication, the Nigerian judiciary does not
seem to have established objective standards by which to
decide human rights cases. This creates a situation where such
cases are approached. on an ad hoe case-by-case basis with the
possibility that contradictory decisions could be delivered in
cases with similar facts. Because of the lack of objectivity in
such decisions, the courts are often accused of having rendered
them for less than honorable calculations. The practices of
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some of the jurisdictions discussed in this article indicate that
this is a concern that must be grappled with in order to breathe
confidence into the human rights adjudication process. There
seems to be a convergence around establishing relatively clear
standards for resolving the questions which human rights cases
present to a legal system. Such standards can be established
lhrough balancing or proportionality analysis.
In Nigeria's case, dealing with the challenge has not been
helped by the country's legal history and the doctrines of the
British legal system that a colonial relationship fostered after
independence. While the British system from . which the
Nigerian equivalent was based has gone through various
phases culminating in the passage of the 1998 Human Rights
Act and the movement of British courts towards a substantive
standard of human rights review based on proportionality, the
Nigerian system remains rooted in its immediate postindependence traditions. This tradition, which has not helped
the legal protection of human rights, cannot be reformed soon
enough. Legal education which inculcates these concerns (and
in particular comparative doctrine) is therefore necessary at
this point.

